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Liberal doctrines of religious toleration are rooted in early modern developments of 
liberty of conscience relying on epistemological skepticism and the privatization of belief. 
However, these underpinnings have recently come under scrutiny, with many theorists 
suggesting that such justifications cannot withstand major issues. An extensive liberal doctrine of 
toleration may find itself incapable of prohibiting deeply concerning practices that flow from 
sincere religious belief, while limited conceptions of toleration exclude precisely those groups 
that necessitate toleration. These problems have led many theorists to seek new grounds for 
religious toleration. However, the early modern project is not irreparably flawed. A close study 
of early modern theological and political texts from the Baptist tradition that inspired both Roger 
Williams and John Locke reveals the particular importance of eschatology to creating a 
comprehensive and extensive doctrine of religious toleration. The Baptist commitment to 
“eschatological millenarianism,” or a political theology characterized by the virtues of patience, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Modern religious toleration, now considered central to the liberal political tradition, is 
largely thought to have emerged in the early modern period as an antidote to violence and 
political instability stemming from religious difference. On the most common account, proto-
liberal and secular accounts of religious toleration such as that offered by John Locke emerged in 
the 17th century, on which later developments in liberal theory are founded.1 However, such 
accounts may not do justice to the original intent of historical theorists. The earliest works 
championing religious toleration often take on a decidedly non-secular form, one that is 
inseparable from the theological commitments of their writers. Understanding – and correctly 
tracing – the early modern roots of toleration requires taking seriously the context and intentions 
of early modern theorists, and displaying a hesitance to force their theories into modern liberal 
categories.  
 One such thread common to the early modern tradition is the shared commitment to 
evangelism. “Evangelical toleration,” as elucidated by Teresa Bejan, suggests “that toleration is a 
necessary precondition for individuals to preach and propagate the Gospel and so convert others 
to it.”2 While evangelical concerns played a significant role in many early modern accounts of 
                                                          
Matthew H. Young (mhyoung@live.unc.edu) is a graduate student of political theory in the Department of Political 
Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  
 
1 Among such accounts: Rawls, John.  Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996; 
Nussbaum, Martha. Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality. New York: 
Basic Books, 2008; Nussbaum, Martha. “The First Founder.” New Republic, September 10 2008. 
 
2 Bejan, Teresa. “Evangelical Toleration.” The Journal of Politics, volume 77, number 4 (2015); 1103. 
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toleration, there is another important religious dimension that has been largely neglected: the role 
of eschatological convictions in promoting liberty of conscience. The eschatological fervor of 
English protestants fueled political thinking and political action alike. As Teresa Bejan writes 
regarding the “Readmission” of Jews to England in 1655, “The apocalyptic expectations of 
English Protestants dictated that the time for the Jews’ conversion was nigh and carefully 
circumscribed toleration a necessary means to that end.”3 Such apocalyptic fervor is evidenced 
throughout 17th century literature on religious toleration. English Baptist pastor and lay 
theologian Thomas Helwys, in the first English-language tract on religious liberty, identified the 
“compulsion of conscience” as undeniably related to the Antichrist and a future apocalyptic 
conflict, and later ministers in the same tradition would continue to rely on eschatological 
arguments to support an expansive conception of religious toleration.  
 Given the admittedly esoteric character of such topics, why ought contemporary theorists 
of toleration study the intricate theological details of early modern arguments? Simply put, 
liberal doctrines of toleration face significant contemporary challenges. The challenges of 
illiberal domination and oppression, threats to political stability, and the inability of modern 
moral language to condemn error have led many theorists to question the value of liberal 
toleration, or to even abandon it wholesale. In the face of such challenges, theorists may seek to 
bolster contemporary accounts of toleration through reexamining historical accounts of religious 
toleration.  
 Eschatological or apocalyptic political movements – movements with an eye towards the 
end of history – are commonly understood to pose an existential threat to political order. Many 
                                                          
 




historians of political thought have suggested that eschatological political theories promote 
violent revolution, social upheaval, and the radical transformation of society.4 Those who 
interpret political history in light of a future, perfected kingdom of God or irenic ‘millennium’ 
have often precipitated radical intolerance and political catastrophe. In the words of theologian 
Jürgen Moltmann, “no hope has caused so much unhappiness.”5 The distinctive eschatological 
beliefs of many early English Baptist congregations, however, lead to a principled and extensive 
commitment to the ideals of religious toleration, liberty of conscience, and the separation of 
church and state powers. The Baptist commitment to “eschatological millenarianism,” or a 
political theology characterized by the virtues of patience, hope, and comity, offer compelling 
solutions to contemporary problems in religious toleration.   
 The structure of this work is as follows: In Chapter 2, I will sketch a few of the most 
salient challenges to contemporary liberal theories of toleration. Chapter 3 will present a brief 
discussion of millenarianism in the history of political thought. Chapter 4 will outline the 
development of religious toleration through the eschatological commitments of English Baptists 
from Thomas Helwys to Roger Williams and later theologians. Chapter 5 will comprise an 
application of the idea of ‘eschatological millenarianism’ to contemporary political theory. The 
concluding chapter will outline several challenging cases where contemporary theories of 
toleration may be insufficient, and outline the practical implications of this eschatological ethos 
of toleration. 
 
                                                          
4 For instance, see Cohn, Norman. The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Messianism in Medieval and 
Reformation Europe and Its Bearing on Modern Totalitarian Movements. New York: Academy Library, 1969. 
 






Chapter 2: Contemporary Challenges to Toleration 
 
Liberal accounts of religion typically rely on the ‘privatization’ of belief, clearly 
delineating between the sacred and the secular. In the words of historian John Coffey, “the New 
Testament primitivism of the sects made it possible to conceive of the church as a private, 
voluntary association.”6 However, critical theorists of religion such as Talal Asad have criticized 
this position and the dominant idea of a purely secular public space. Asad suggests that the 
“repeated explosions of intolerance in American history” are “entirely compatible (indeed 
intertwined) with secularism in a highly modern society.”7 On this reading, secularism often 
carries with it a militant bias against members of conservative, traditional, or illiberal religions. 
Perhaps nowhere are the secular sources of “explosions of intolerance” so clearly reflected as in 
France’s “burkha bans,” Switzerland’s 2009 ban on the construction of new minarets on Islamic 
mosques, and other such harsh limitations on religious expression justified by appeal to ideals of 
secularity. 
While such policies demonstrate hostility towards the public exercise of illiberal faith, 
they are often justified along liberal principles; in one such case, Dutch feminist Ayaan Hirsi Ali 
paradoxically supported the Swiss ban on minarets as “a vote for tolerance and inclusion.”8 
                                                          
 
6 Coffey, John. “Puritanism and Liberty Revisited: The Case for Toleration in the English Revolution.” The 
Historical Journal, volume 41, no. 4 (1998); 978. 
 
7 Asad, Talal. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Stanford University Press, 2003; 7. 
 
8 Ali, Ayaan Hirsi. “Swiss ban on minarets was a vote for tolerance and inclusion.” The Christian Science Monitor, 
5 December 2009. 
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Charles Taylor identifies a hostile tendency among certain theories of religion that conceive of 
secular regimes as “bulwarks against religion” rather than aiming to fairly balance and negotiate 
difference between all manner of religious and non-religious belief systems.9 Aggressively 
secularized conceptions of the relationship between the state and religion such as the French 
ideal of laïcité, contribute to the exclusion of the devout from secular public spaces. 
 These are features of what may be termed the “exclusive” account of liberal toleration, 
one where illiberal religious groups may be excluded from the boundaries of the tolerable. These 
frontiers are often drawn along lines consistent with the modern, liberal, ‘privatized’ conception 
of religion, displaying a clear bias in favor of the Protestant religious tradition. As Jeff Spinner-
Halev has said, “liberalism will tolerate non-Protestants, as long as they conceive of their 
religion as a matter of individual conscience and privatized practice.”10 Yet the exclusionary 
approach to toleration conjures a significant problem, what I term the problem of necessity. A 
society entirely composed of those who affirm basic liberal doctrines has little need for 
toleration. Instead, we require – and may demonstrate – the virtue of toleration when we 
encounter and live in peace with those whose beliefs, thoughts, actions, traditions, and cultures 
are repugnant to us on a deep and visceral level. As Bernard Williams puts it, “We need to 
tolerate other people and their ways of life only in situations that make it very difficult to do 
so.”11 The virtue of toleration is not seen when we welcome those who are fundamentally like us, 
                                                          
 
9 Taylor, Charles. “How to Define Secularism” in Boundaries of Toleration, eds. Alfred Stepan and Charles Taylor. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2014; 74. 
 
10 Spinner-Halev, Jeff. “Hinduism, Christianity, and Liberal Religious Toleration.” Political Theory, vol. 33, no, 1 
(2005); 33. 
 
11 Williams, Bernard. “Tolerating the Intolerable” in The Politics of Toleration in Modern Life, ed. Susan Mendus. 




but when we extend gestures of friendliness, neighborliness, friendship, and openness to those 
whom we struggle to understand or reason with, much less appreciate. Exclusive accounts of 
toleration fail to grasp the reality Michael Walzer has noted: “most of the groups that are 
tolerated … are in fact intolerant.”12 If we demand adherence to liberalism as a precondition for 
tolerating a group, we run the risk of only extending toleration to those with whom we share 
substantial normative agreement and so may fail to practice toleration in any meaningful sense.  
 In recent years, however, a more “inclusive” model has been offered as an alternative to 
the exclusionary model of toleration favored by many liberal theorists. This alternative approach 
redefines toleration in affective rather than institutional terms. Andrew Murphy distinguishes 
between two similar but distinct virtues, suggesting that “we use the term “toleration” to refer to 
social or political practices, and “tolerance” to refer to attitudes.13 The former, Murphy 
surmises, is central to political liberalism while the latter is not. Richard Avramenko and Michael 
Promisel, however, document the shift in recent theories of toleration from historical “toleration” 
to “tolerance,” writing “The familiar principles of ethical objection and the refusal to interfere—
once invoked to assuage violent conflict and cruelty—no longer suffice. Toleration has become a 
positive demand for recognition and respect.”14  
 Many attempts at crafting a more inclusive standard of toleration lapse into demands for 
positive acceptance, or what Murphy terms “tolerance.” This requirement for the positive 
assessment and acceptance of views that we (by definition) find objectionable may threaten the 
                                                          
12 Walzer, Michael. On Toleration. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999; 80.  
 
13 Murphy, Andrew. “Tolerance, Toleration, and the Liberal Tradition.” Polity, vol. 29, no. 3 (1997); 595.  
 
14 Avramenko, Richard, and Michael Promisel. “When Toleration Becomes a Vice: Naming Aristotle’s Third 




stability of toleration. While the concern with exclusive accounts of toleration is that they fail to 
encompass intolerant minorities who are rightfully the subject of toleration, inclusive accounts 
may rob a society of the moral language necessary to condemn those morally reprehensible 
views that are truly beyond the pale.15  
 I suggest that any adequate approach to toleration in today’s ever-increasingly globalized 
and interconnected world must draw a position between what I have called the “exclusive” and 
“inclusive” models of toleration. It must be possible to tolerate many groups who hold positions 
inconsistent with liberal values—else we are hardly promoting toleration. Conversely, our 
account must also reserve adequate moral language and space to condemn certain truly 
unconscionable acts or beliefs. To repeat a common aphorism, liberal democracy is not a suicide 
pact. Lastly, out account must give us reason not only to begrudgingly tolerate those we disagree 
with, but to respectfully engage with them as co-citizens of a shared political community. 
 To this concern – the need for a stronger comprehensive account of toleration – is added 
one additional concern, or what John Rawls terms the “problem of stability.” A regime of 
toleration ought not to be contingent on a distribution of power that may be subject to rapid or 
sudden change. If toleration is going to serve the long-term stability of a polity, it ought to be 
more than a modus vivendi—it must be principled.16 If toleration is to survive—and history 
warns us how rare it is—we must offer compelling, principled reasons to tolerate practices, 
beliefs, and people we disagree with. Given the rare yet precious nature of toleration, almost any 
                                                          
15 This is an issue taken up at greater length in Avramenko and Promisel, “When Toleration Becomes a Vice.” They 
note, among other things, how some liberal theorists have gone so far as to   demand respect for deeply concerning 
cultural and religious practices such as female genital mutilation. 
 
16 See Rawls, Political Liberalism. 
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system of toleration is worth pursuing. However, it is possible to craft a system that avoids many 
of the problems that plague less comprehensive or unbalanced accounts of toleration.  
In summary, liberal toleration faces three particularly challenging obstacles. First, it must 
not be satisfied with a circumscribed account that excludes from toleration precisely those 
groups that require tolerance of us. Second, if liberalism is to be distinguished from libertinism, 
it must retain the moral language and standing necessary to sharply rebuke, condemn, and 
proscribe horrific abuses that simply cannot be tolerated.17 Lastly, a successful account of 
toleration must be principled, compelling, and feasible. It must offer individuals and institutions 
compelling reasons to not only tolerate but peacefully live alongside those we dislike or disagree 
with. With these problems in mind, I turn now to outlining a line of argument in early modern 









                                                          






Chapter 3: Political Millenarianism 
Since the time of Christ, few concepts have so thoroughly seized the imagination of the 
deeply religious than the idea of the Millennium—an irenic, thousand-year kingdom where the 
church rules alongside God on earth. From the fall of Rome until the late medieval period, 
church teaching generally followed the writing of St. Augustine of Hippo, who interpreted the 
Bible’s eschatological prophecies figuratively. In the 12th century, however, the apocalyptic 
interpretations of the Italian priest Joachim of Fiore provided an outline for the radical 
transformation of society in light of the impending end of the world. From the followers of Fra 
Dolcino of Navara to the Taborites to the Münster Anabaptists, fervor for establishing the 
millennial kingdom of Christ led many groups to adopt radical means of living and to strive for 
rapid political change. Norman Cohn, Eric Voegelin, and many others have suggested that 
millennial doctrines become ascendant during periods of existing social upheaval, and that 
millenarian politics form the seed of modern illiberal and totalitarian impulses.18 By implication, 
millenarian politics pose a threat to liberal toleration and the pluralistic society. John Coffey goes 
so far as to blame millenarian eschatology for the backsliding of toleration in the late 17th 
century, writing “Tolerationist dichotomies were to be swallowed up by millennial holism.”19   
                                                          
18 See Norman Cohn’s In Search of the Millennium, and Voegelin, Eric. Science, Politics, and Gnosticism. Regnery 
Publishing, 1968. 
 




These accounts of the historical role of millenarian eschatology err in their failure to 
recognize important differences in theological formulations of the doctrine of the millennium. 
One common distinction has to do with the temporal placement of the millennium. Some 
Protestant theological traditions (including, generally speaking, the Scottish covenanters, 
Presbyterians, and Continental Reformed churches) anticipated Christ’s triumphant Second 
Coming (or Parousia) at the culmination of the millennium, as the final crowning jewel of a 
temporal Christian kingdom established by the judicious rule of the saints on earth. Others—
most notably within the early General and Particular Baptist20 traditions in England—believed 
that the true church’s experience would be characterized by alienation, oppression, and 
persecution on earth. Christ’s return, at the nadir of the church’s experience, would precede the 
establishment of the millennial kingdom through his power alone. These two approaches mirror 
the common—yet historically anachronistic—theoretic distinction between “pre-” and “post-” 
millennial eschatology. However, the precise timing of the millennium and parousia is largely 
irrelevant to the practice of politics. Rather, toleration is closely related to the question of what 
role the faithful are to play in the establishment of the Kingdom of God. 
 In the same article that Coffey vilifies millenarian politics, he notes that not all 
millenarian doctrines required violent revolution or the purification of society through ritualized 
violence, writing “[Thomas] Collier, for instance, rejected his earlier conviction that the saints 
would imitate the wars of Israel and usher in the millennium … He still believed in a future 
millennium in which the saints would rule, but this would only be inaugurated after the Second 
                                                          
20 The fledgling Baptist movement in England was divided between “General” Baptists who affirmed man’s exercise 
of free will in salvation, and “Particular” or Calvinistic Baptists, who taught predestination and God’s sovereignty 
over salvation. Some accounts have suggested that Baptist toleration stems from “free will” or non-coercive 
soteriology, however the geneology of Baptist toleration I offer here demonstrates otherwise. Expansive doctrines of 
religious toleration were promoted by General and Particular Baptists alike throughout the 17th century, from 
Helwys’ General Baptist congregation to the authors of the 1689 London Baptist Confession of Faith. 
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Coming of Christ. In the meantime the church must eschew violence and the magistrate must 
rule only over ‘the Bodies and Estates of men’.”21 While the shift in Collier’s thinking may have 
included a move from post- to pre- millennialism, the primary motivation for toleration lies in 
the conviction that the church is not tasked with establishing the kingdom of God on earth.  
By transcending debates over pre- and post- millennialism, theorists are able to focus 
more clearly on the prescriptive aspects of political theology. In an insightful work on 
millenarian theology and politics, Jürgen Moltmann shares his concern with the destructive 
tendencies of a certain type of millenarian politics, writing that “no hope has caused so much 
unhappiness.”22 However, Moltmann recognizes that the disastrous millenarian politics that 
Cohn, Coffey, and others fear stem from one specific form of millenarianism that seeks radical 
social transformation—this is historical millenarianism. Moltmann suggests an alternative to this 
activist eschatology, what he terms “eschatological millennialism.” Rather than seeking to 
establish the millennium on earth through radical change, in eschatological millennialism the 
expectation of a reign of saints is projected into the future as “a necessary picture of hope in 
resistance.”23 This  healthy eschatological millenarianism serves as an image of what it means to 
display “hope in resistance, in suffering, and in the exiles of this world.”24 If taken as  a blueprint 
for revolution, millenarian politics may lead to catastrophic outcomes, but “incorporated in 
eschatology” and taken as a hopeful portrayal of future peace “it gives strength to survive and to 
                                                          
21 Coffey, 979.  
 
22 Moltmann, The Coming of God; 146 
 
23 Moltmann 1996, 192.  
 




resist.”25 While many contemporary Protestants followed the path of historical millenarianism 
towards violence, intolerance, and radical transformation of political life, many clergy and 
congregations in the fledgling English Baptist movement developed a patient, non-violent, 
hopeful political eschatology that exemplifies Moltmann’s eschatological millenarianism. This 
alternative form of millenarianism directly influenced the development of doctrines of religious 
toleration through projecting a hopeful future that the faithful must patiently await, while 












                                                          






Chapter 4: Eschatological Toleration 
The eschatological dimension of Baptist tolerance is evidenced even in its earliest 
formulations such as that of Thomas Helwys, one of the intellectual progenitors of modern 
Baptist theology and a leader of the historically important Gainesborough-Scrooby separatist 
congregation. Helwys helped engineer the congregation’s move to Leiden, in Holland, and there 
authored one of the first Baptist confessions of faith.26 While many in the congregation 
emigrated to the Americas, Helwys returned to England to found a General Baptist congregation. 
With him, Helwys brought the manuscript for his A Short Declaration of The Mystery of Iniquity, 
believed to be the earliest English-language tract on religious liberty, which begins with the 
suggestion that the apocalyptic prophecies of Scripture foretell the audience’s contemporary 
history. Helwys quickly connects the religious intolerance of the Roman Catholic church with 
the apocalyptic regime of the Antichrist, writing “who does not know and see that this prophecy 
[regarding the “Man of Sin”27] is fulfilled in that Romish28 mystery of iniquity.”29 The central 
feature of the Antichrist’s reign is religious intolerance: “The man of sin will have a kingdom 
where there shall be mighty power and authority one over another’s conscience, appointing and 
                                                          
26 Rich, Antony D. “Thomas Helwys’ First Confession of Faith 1610.” Baptist Quarterly, vol. 43, no. 4 (2009). 
 
27 An eschatological figure mentioned in 2 Thessalonians 2, typically identified in Christian theology as the 
Antichrist.  
 
28 “Romish” meaning having to do with the Roman Catholic Church. 
 
29 Helwys, Thomas, and Richard Groves. A Short Declaration of the Mystery of Iniquity, (1611/1612). Mercer 
University Press, 1998; 12 
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compelling men how they shall worship their God, and to imprison, to banish, and to cause to die 
them that resist.”30  
Helwys turns to formulating clearly delineated realms for spiritual and temporal power, 
writing that “an earthly sword is ordained of God only for an earthly power, and a spiritual sword 
for a spiritual power.”31 Accordingly, the “earthly sword” may only be used to punish offenses 
against the earthly power, while punishment for spiritual transgressions is beyond the authority 
of the state. Within the spiritual realm, or “the kingdom of Christ, which is heavenly and endures 
forever,” faith is valued over compelled obedience and Christ extends lordship over his 
subjects.”32 On earth, however, “no sword of justice [is] at all required or permitted to smite any 
for refusing Christ.”33 Instead, the only reason the monarch possesses power is for “the well-
governing and ruling of a king’s state and kingdom, which is worldly and must fade away.”34 
Helwys echoes this distinction in the inscription he wrote in the frontispiece of a copy delivered 
to King James I: “The King is a mortal man and not God, therefore [he] has no power over the 
immortal souls of his subjects.”35 “What greater evil can be committed against Christ?” asks 
Helwys, than to allow temporal powers to infringe upon his spiritual kingdom? This usurpation 
of Christ’s right to rule his church is, according to Helwys, the fulfilment of apocalyptic 
prophecy; “therein lies the depth of the mystery of iniquity of the man of sin, in taking wholly 
                                                          
 
30 Helwys, The Mystery of Iniquity. 23.  
 
31 Helwys, The Mystery of Iniquity. 35.  
 
32 Helwys, The Mystery of Iniquity. 38-39. 
 
33 Helwys, The Mystery of Iniquity. 39.  
 
34 Helwys, The Mystery of Iniquity. 39.  
 
35 Helwys, The Mystery of Iniquity. Frontispiece, reproduced in facsimile.  
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from him [Christ] his power, and yet professing his name.”36 Those earthly monarchs who 
profess Christianity, yet usurp Christ’s power by wielding temporal power to punish spiritual 
error reveal themselves to be Anti-Christian. As all spiritual matters belong to God, political 
power cannot be used to abridge any spiritual error; instead, toleration must be extended to all: 
“Let them be heretics, Turks37, Jews, or whatsoever, it appertains not to the earthly power to 
punish them in the least measure.”38  
Though Helwys does not explicitly outline the nature of the millennium, his identification 
of the Roman Catholic Church and the Church of England as the first and second beasts of the 
apocalypse, respectively, firmly situates his vision of the church within a period of persecution or 
tribulation prior to Christ’s Second Coming. Indeed, Helwys suggests that there is “a true 
pattern” wherein “the people of God are persecuted when the civil power does judge the cause of 
their faith and profession in their religion to God.”39 Rather than seizing power to reform the 
contrary minded, the example of Christ demonstrates that the faithful ought to “instruct with 
meekness, and by preaching the Word, seek their conversion, with all longsuffering, and not to 
destroy them by severe punishments.”40  
Even the Jewish people, who Helwys suggests are “the greatest enemies of Christ that are 
upon the earth” ought to be tolerated with patience and love.Thus the duty of the church is to 
                                                          
 
36 Helwys, The Mystery of Iniquity. 53. 
 
37 A term often used, at the time, to refer to Muslims. 
 
38 Helwys, 53. 
 
39 Helwys, 58. 
  




exemplify an attitude of patience and longsuffering – a rule that “shall never be disannulled or 
made void while the heavens and the earth endure.”41   
This theme of eschatological patience is continued in the work of John Murton, Helwys’ 
protégé and the direct inspiration for Roger Williams’ Bloudy Tenent of Persecution. An elder in 
Helwys’ congregation, Murton would later be imprisoned for his teachings on religious liberty. 
In A Most Humble Supplication to the Kings Majesties, printed 1621, Murton claims that 
“courses of afflicting our bodies for conscience case are not of Christ, but of Anti-christ.”42 Like 
Helwys, Murton suggests that political rulers who compel faith “sit in the consciences of men, 
where Christ should sit” and have committed a great treason. Thus they “uphold the Beast, and 
fight against the Lambe.”43 44The persecution of any person “only for cause of conscience” is 
contrary to both Christ’s example and Scriptural testimony.45 
Murton introduces a theme that would become common in later works, basing the 
doctrine of toleration in the parable of the wheat and tares46 in Matthew 13. In this parable 
describing weeds that are indistinguishable from wheat in a cultivated field, Christ describes the 
faithful as wheat, while unbelievers grow up alongside them as tares. Murton instructs both 
church and government alike that they ought to “do as God directeth you in his Word, that 
                                                          
41 Helwys, 58-59.  
 
42 Murton, John. A Most Humble Supplication to the Kings Majesties. University of Michigan Library, 1621; 2. 
 
43 Murton, 34.  
 
44 That is to say, those who compel the consciences of others through force or use temporal force to punish spiritual 
error are siding with Antichrist, rather than Christ.  
 
45 Murton, 4.  
 
46 The word translated commonly as “tare” (or “weed” in some translations) refers to darnel ryegrass (lolium 




cannot lie: Let the wheat and tares grow together in the world, until the Harvest.”47 Exegeting 
this parable, Murton argues that “repentance must continually be waited for” and that “the 
worldly weapons of earthly Kingdoms cannot accomplish the things of Christ’s Kingdom.”48 
Even those who are without doubt unbelievers must be tolerated, as no one is beyond the 
possibility of reform or salvation; in turn, “the kings of Nations have no command at all to 
destroy the bodies of the contrary minded, they are forbidden to pluck up the tares.”49 Murton’s 
use of this parable strengthens the claim begun by Helwys, that the church is tasked with 
displaying patience and longsuffering in the world, while earnestly seeking to spread the gospel 
through non-coercive evangelistic efforts. Condemnation or punishment for unbelief is not 
within the power of earthly institutions, but is wholly the responsibility of God and is to be 
deferred “until the end of this world.”50 Divine retribution for unbelief, if it does exist, is a matter 
for apocalyptic times and for God himself to accomplish.  
The structure of these works treads a careful line between the pastoral and the political; 
both Helwys and Murton exhort the church to tolerant attitudes towards unbelievers, while also 
appealing to the governmental powers for greater religious liberties.51 Helwys includes the claim 
that “difference in religion could never be proved sedition against the state,”52 while Murton 
                                                          
47 Murton, 4.  
 
48 Murton, 24.  
 
49 Murton, 34.  
 
50 Murton, 23.  
 
51 It is work noting, of course, that the 17th century elision between church and state blurs these categories of appeal. 
A letter concerning toleration directed to the King might appeal to the King of England’s status as a Christian and 
the head of the Anglican Church, as well as his legal status as monarch. 
 




devotes an entire chapter to arguing against the contention “that toleration will be hurtful, and 
dangerous to the state.”53 Moreover, each is clear that they do not request exemption from the 
normal laws of the state, instead stating “We only desire that God might have that which is his, 
which is the heart and soul in that worship which he requires.”54 Meanwhile, those who fail to 
pay due obedience to the civil authorities are to “bear their burden” and may be destroyed 
accordingly by the earthly powers.55 In the Humble Petition and Representation of Several 
Churches of God … Commonly (though falsely) Called Anabaptists, a plea for toleration 
delivered to Parliament in 1649, Baptist minister William Kiffin worked to distinguish his own 
movement  from that of the Levellers, Anabaptists, and other radical groups that combined 
religious toleration with efforts to abolish monarchical rule. Instead, the Baptists claimed “our 
meetings are not at all to intermeddle with the ordering or altering Civil Government (which we 
humbly and submissively leave unto the supreme Power,) but solely for the advancement of the 
Gospel.”56 Centuries before Moltmann’s helpful distinction between historical and eschatological 
millenarianism, Baptist proponents of religious toleration strove to distinguish their peaceful and 
tolerant approach from the revolutionary movements that surrounded them.  
Murton’s treatise on religious toleration soon caught the eye of none other than Roger 
Williams, a Particular Baptist57 minister who in 1630 fled religious oppression in England for the 
Puritan-governed Massachusetts Bay Colony. Five years later, finding that the Boston Puritans 
were no more tolerant than Laud’s Anglicans, Williams would establish the colony of Rhode 
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Island and Providence Plantations, and enshrine absolute liberty of conscience within the 
colony’s 1663 royal charter.58 In The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution, Williams pledges his debt to 
John Murton while expanding further on the arguments offered by the earlier Baptists. 
While Williams, more than his lesser-known counterparts, has been particularly subject 
to liberal reinterpretation, similar threads of eschatological salience are found throughout his 
work. W. Clark Gilpin suggests that Williams considered the church to exist in “the wilderness 
condition”—“a transitional state between the apostolic churches and their approaching 
restoration.”59 Williams ardently desired purity in the church (indeed, his oft-referenced “hedge 
of separation” between the church and state was intended to protect the church from the 
corrupting influence of the state, not vice versa), yet recognized that such purity could not be 
obtained until after Christ’s return. The faithful Christian must be “willing to follow and be like 
him [Christ] in doing, in suffering;” however, this suffering is not without hope or end, as “Yet 
shalt thou see him, reign with him, eternally admire him, and enjoy him, when he shortly 
comes.”60 So Christian patience in the face of suffering is paired with a hope in Christ’s return 
and subsequent triumph over evil. Yet in the interim—in the “wilderness”—the church only has 
recourse to the methods of “his Martyrs or Witnesses, standing before the Lord, and testifying his 
holy Truth during all the Reign of the Beast.”61 Williams exemplifies three traits central to the 
Baptist account of eschatological millenarianism that produced religious toleration: first, a hope 
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in the future establishment of Christ’s kingdom; second, a patience and longsuffering with 
regards to establishing that kingdom; third, a commitment to conscientious engagement with and 
solicitude towards unbelievers.  
These themes are once again reiterated by the Cambridge-educated Particular Baptist 
pastor Christopher Blackwood, in a 1644 treatise entitled The Storming of Antichrist in His Two 
Last and Strongest Garrisons: of Compulsion of Conscience and Infants Baptisme. Once again, 
religious compulsion is again identified as inappropriate for normal times; “Compulsion is 
unlawful in Religion, from universal practice … till the time of Antichrist.”62 Moreover, “it is a 
note of the false church to persecute, and of the true Church to be persecuted.”63 The faithful 
should not expect to wield temporal power to bring others to Christ, but instead should expect to 
be persecuted: “Whosoever will live Godly in Christ Jesus shall suffer persecution.”64 The 
parable of the wheat and tares is again taken to be normatively instructive, as “Christ forbids 
pulling up Tares, lest they pull up good Wheat.”65  
One of the clearest statements of the Baptist eschatology came in the Humble 
Representation and Vindication of 1654, in which an assembled body of Baptist pastors and 
theologians concluded that there was no ground to expect that they would enjoy earthly rule until 
after Christ’s return in glory. To the contrary, they “expect as their portion, patiently to suffer the 
world as the Scriptures direct them.”66 The paired hope and patience of Baptist eschatology are 
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clearly displayed here: the church earnestly hopes in a future age of peace and Christian 
eschatological fulfilment. Yet, they admit that there is no ground to expect that political power 
should be giving to the church to make the millennium imminent.  
 The distinctiveness of these views on civil government and toleration stand in sharp relief 
to other 17th century Protestant doctrines. Whereas the Westminster Confession of Faith and 
Savoy Declaration reserve for the civil magistrate the right to suppress blasphemy, heresy, and 
unbelief, the Baptist Confession of 1644 (revised 1646) sets forth the liberty of conscience as 
“the tenderest thing unto all conscientious men” and as a liberty “without which all other 
liberties will not be worth the naming, much less enjoying.”67 Other branches of Protestantism, 
affirming the historical millenarian tendency, sought to use the power of civil governance to 
protect the purity of Christian doctrine, institute an established church, and prevent the 
publication of blasphemous or heretical works – all in pursuit of creating the conditions 
necessary for the foundation of the millennial kingdom. The eschatological millenarianism of the 
Baptists, by contrast, firmly places eschatological fulfilment and the millennial kingdom in the 
future, and out of the hands of politicians and churchmen. Judgment and spiritual rule are solely 
the purview of the Messiah to come, and the millennial kingdom “shall be then fully perfected 
when He [Christ] shall the second time come in glory to reign among his saints.”68 
 Within the eschatological framework affirmed by early English Baptists, political power 
was improperly used if it encroached on the domain of conscience. These Baptists fully expected 
to see political power abused by secular and religious authorities during their time. In light of 
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this pessimistic expectation, they were convinced that their duty was to preach the Gospel (“To 
witness to the Beast” in the common parlance of the 17th century) rather than to coerce 
unbelievers to join their religion. The church is “patiently to suffer from the world” rather than 
seek to fundamentally transform it through radical political action. The exhortation to display 
patience and longsuffering, however, is not entirely unalloyed. It is married to an eschatological 
hope—that is, a confident belief that ‘good’ will win out in the end, that ill behavior may be 
punished, that the evil will not be allowed to ultimately triumph over the faithful, and that there 
will come an irenic society in accord with their deeply held beliefs. This hope enables the 

















Chapter 5: Eschatology in Political Theory 
The category of eschatology within theology refers to doctrines concerning the end—
both in the historical and teleological senses—of human existence.  Adapting Moltmann’s 
conception of eschatology as a formative ideal, I suggest that it may also be understood as a 
feature of most comprehensive political theories. Theories which contain images of the end of 
human life, the ideal society, or meditations on the telos of political life participate in 
eschatological thinking. In Politics and Vision, Sheldon Wolin suggests the “projective quality” 
of political philosophy, writing “The political philosopher, by an act of thought, strove to project 
a more perfect order into future time.”69 Much like an eschatological vision at the center of 
religious politics, “at the center of the enterprise of political theory was an imaginative element, 
an ordering vision of what the political system ought to be and what it might become.”70 
According to Wolin, however, these visions of future utopia need not always be actualized; 
instead, the maintenance of idealistic and imaginative visions—even if logically or politically 
unfeasible—may serve as a guide in the development of more realistic forms of political order. 
In Wolin’s summation, “Political knowledge of the best remained absolutely essential if men 
were to share even that slight participation in reality allowed by the gods.”71 Thus the utopia, a 
sort of secularized millennium, serves as an ordering ideal, an image of the perfect society 
                                                          
69 Wolin, Sheldon. Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought. Princeton 
University Press, 2004; 33. 
 
70 Wolin, Politics and Vision. 33.  
 
71 Wolin, Politics and Vision. 34. 
24 
 
projected upon future time as a guide to human action. The political philosopher—and 
particularly the ideal theorist—in Wolin’s account may be participating in eschatological 
thinking broadly construed.  
It is in this broader sense of eschatology, one that admits of secularized or non-
particularized visions of the end, that Alan Revering has identified a common thread of 
“eschatological hope” in Michael Walzer’s political writings. Walzer, according to Revering, 
holds forth a “leading image of a participatory, self-determining community” that generates his 
own commitment to toleration: tolerance lessens persecution and preserves life, while also 
sustaining common life within the participatory community.72 Tolerance is the mechanism by 
which vastly different individuals are empowered to live in communities that slowly begin to 
approximate the ideal community. In a not dissimilar fashion, John Rawls presents an 
eschatological vision that dictates the realization of political liberalism: “By showing how the 
social world may realize the features of a realistic utopia, political philosophy provides a long-
term goal of political endeavor, and in working toward it gives meaning to what we can do 
today.”73 The “realistic utopia” Rawls describes may be, in practice, much like a conception of 
the millennial kingdom, thoroughly secularized and liberal. At any rate, eschatology in the 
broadest sense is not confined only to religious theories. Early Baptist eschatological arguments 
for religious toleration provide helpful correctives to both religious and secular modern theories 
of toleration.  
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Just as the idea of eschatology may be secularized—or at least, expanded to include 
secular theories—the lessons of Baptist eschatological millenarianism may be secularized and 
applied to contemporary theories of toleration. I have attempted to draw out three normatively 
important dimensions to the Baptist account of toleration: the virtues of patience, hope, and 
comity. The Baptist promoters of religious toleration did so patiently, determining to forgo 
radical revolutionary change. This patience moderated their hope in a future millennium to come 
– and in turn, their hope made their patience more bearable. Lastly, the Baptists eschewed 
separation from the world, instead engaging at length with other groups. These three traits form 
the backbone of a Baptist ethos of toleration. I will address each aspect of this ethos and their 
contemporary theoretical application in turn.  
Patience 
 The most striking aspect of the Baptist political thinkers I have outlined is their patience. 
To gloss Roger Williams’ message, the central duty of the church ‘in the wilderness’ is to 
patiently wait for the Parousia and the external establishment of the millennium. Rather than 
seizing political power to impose their spiritual will on unbelievers (as is typically the case with 
apocalyptic revolutionaries), these early Baptists believed that even those they considered 
diametrically opposed to their aims must be patiently tolerated until the end of the world. 
Patience, in itself, may be a close relative of the virtue of toleration. Further, a lack of 
eschatological patience is displayed by the chiliastic political theories that command the faithful 
to attempt to collapse the distant eschatological future into the present, bringing about the 
millennium through radical or violent means. Revering phrases this somewhat differently, 
concluding that “any eschatology that enters into political debate in a modern, pluralistic society 
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… must be informed by a profound sense of limitation.”74 Leninism, Nazism, and Münster 
Anabaptism all lacked this sense of limitation or eschatological patience, and political 
catastrophe resulted.  
The disastrous consequences of eschatological impatience in politics may be obvious; 
however, it is difficult to explain why patience is a positive virtue. Provided we know what the 
ideal society is like, why ought we wait to institute it? In some secularized theories, resource 
may be had by appealing to the fundamental right of each individual to pursue a good life free of 
unnecessary coercion—and it takes quite a lot of coercion to create a millennium. However, 
within the doctrines of the Baptists, eschatological patience was closely tied to the idea of 
evangelism, and to the parable of the wheat and tares. Religious toleration formed a critical part 
of the ideal picture for present society, in the hope “that in these latter days” the civil authorities 
might “open a door of greater liberty to the Saints, for the spreading of the Gospel in the Nations 
of the World.”75 Tolerance is not a principle that militates against evangelical hopes, but the sine 
qua non of a society that allows the free exchange of ideas. It is worth noting, of course, that the 
virtue of patience is not unbounded. In as much as this describes an individual ethos (rather than 
an institutional scheme), there are situations where patience is neither required, nor ought to be 
encouraged. Profound moral ills cannot be patiently endured – but many lesser ills must be. The 
practice of patience is, ultimately, a strong presumption against coercion, against proscription, 
and against the exclusion of ‘unbelievers’ from our political community. It is, positively stated, a 
commitment to usher others into the millennium with us, rather than drag them into the perfect 
society after us.  
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The ideal of political or eschatological patience, if exercised alone, seems likely to cause 
despair, hopelessness, or disappointment. It may appear to be defeatist. However, patience for 
the early English Baptists was not practiced alone: it was accompanied by a firm and confident 
hope in the future. The idea of a millennial kingdom serves to embody lived history with a 
profound sense of meaning, offering hope to all those who live within it. In Moltmann’s words, 
“Only millenarianism makes it possible to understand the kingdom of God not apocalyptically 
but teleologically.” 76 Rather than viewing the end as an apocalyptic conflict or as entirely 
unknowable, peaceful, eschatological millenarianism allows us to reinterpret the kingdom of 
God (or our chosen secular utopic vision) as a moral and political idea. Eschatological 
millenarianism reshapes history from one conceived as a Manichean struggle without end 
between the forces of good and evil and resituates our historical experience in relation to a plan. 
“Only millenarianism makes of eschatology teleology,” writes theologian Stanley Hauerwas.77 
“Christians believe in history,” he continues; Christians “believe we come from a past that would 
find its fulfilment in the future.” The temporal and teleological account of historical progress in 
light of the millennium allows the Christian (and the 17th century Baptist) to believe “that time 
has a narrative logic, which means that time is not just one damn thing after another.”78  
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 For the Baptist proponents of toleration, eschatological millenarianism contained a hope 
in the future. This hope carries with it many valences: it assures the believer that justice will be 
done in the end; it guarantees that evil will not ultimately triumph over good. It is not simply a 
balm on the soul grown wearing of patiently suffering (though it certainly is restorative) – it is 
the assurance that allows the Christian to leave the tares and wheat to grow together in the field 
until the harvest. Only one who is certain that the weeds will not choke out the true crop can 
display such patience. Eschatological hope provides the psychological and historical 
preconditions for the exercise of patience, offering both comfort to the weary and confidence that 
patience will not bear with it impermissible consequences. Eschatological hope is central to the 
success of a confident and expansive regime of toleration.  
 Eschatological hope may seem inaccessible to those who, unlike the early Baptists, do 
not believe in a divine author of history. However, at least some political thinkers have presented 
more-or-less secularized conceptions of eschatological hope. In a sentiment popularized by 
Martin Luther King Jr., the 18th century abolitionist Theodore Parker wrote “Look at the facts of 
the world. You see a continual and progressive triumph of the right. I do not pretend to 
understand the moral universe; the arc is a long one … from what I see I am sure it bends 
towards justice.”79 For the secular, eschatological hope might be divined from the progress of 
technology, society, or morality. This type of hope is demonstrated by the epistemic confidence 
of both John Locke and J.S. Mill. “Truth certainly would do well enough, if she were once left to 
shift for herself,” writes Locke in A Letter Concerning Toleration. “She is not taught by Laws, 
nor has she any need of Force to procure her entrance into the minds of men.”80 This confidence 
                                                          





that truth will win out over falsehood underpins the Lockean account of toleration as well as 
Mill’s argument for free speech in On Liberty. In this sense, secular eschatological hope may be 
reminiscent of ‘Whig history’, or the idea of an inexorable movement towards progress and 
enlightenment.81  
 The dangers of unalloyed eschatological hope of the religious sort have been revealed in 
the actions of those groups Moltmann classifies as “historical millenarian.” Whipped into frenzy 
by their hope, yet unmoderated by patience, chiliastic groups displayed shocking intolerance and 
violence in pursuit of millenarian ends. However, the secular equivalent may be equally 
threatening. The same sense of moral and civilizational progress that underpinned Mill’s 
confident approach to speech also permitted the oppression of less-advanced societies and people 
groups, and belief in the inevitability of Western expansion provided theoretical heft to the 19th 
century idea of Manifest Destiny. Whiggish history, just like the unrestrained hope of historical 
millenarian or apocalyptic cults, quickly becomes a vice.  
 This point illustrates the strength of the Baptist account of toleration I have outlined. 
Hope and patience, if separated or practiced unilaterally, fail to provide a basis for toleration that 
is extensive and confident, yet also cautious and restrained in action. Practiced together, patience 
and hope hold each other in tension, providing necessary counterpoints. Hope emboldens 
patience, while patience restrains hope.  
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 There is one final aspect of this Baptist eschatological vision – the ideal of comity or 
engagement. The practice of toleration among 17th century Christians was almost unavoidable 
intertwined with their evangelical intentions. It is a fact of history that unbelievers were tolerated 
in the hopes that many would come to believe in the Christian faith. The wheat and tares are left 
to grow in the field together until the harvest, but this parable was often framed in terms of 
preventing the alienation of unbelievers. “If those that come not till the last hour should be 
destroyed,” writes John Murton, “then should they never come, but be prevented.”82 Patience is 
warranted at least partially in the hopes of conversion.  
 How can this sort of conclusion not lead to an invidious type of toleration, that only 
secures it instrumentally? Jean-Jacques Rousseau captures this concern in The Social Contract, 
suggesting “It is impossible to live in peace with those one believes to be damned.”83 Connecting 
toleration to the hope of conversion, the objection may be continued, undermines the equal status 
of all members of society, recreating one’s fellow citizens as prizes to be won or converted rather 
than respected. This object is, at minimum, quite plausible.  
 On purely empirical grounds, however, there is some reason to doubt Rousseau’s 
conclusion. Many of the Protestant proponents of toleration not only believed the other “to be 
damned” but often used damning language in their descriptions of them. However, as Michael 
Walzer has observed, this has not unilaterally led such theorists to hate those they deem to be 
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‘damned’, in fact, it appears that many in our world find it quite possible to live in peace with 
those who do not share their core commitments.  
 Ultimately, however, Rousseau’s objection forgets the temporal quality of eschatological 
millenarianism. Heaven is not made on earth, and the Kingdom is not yet come. The Christian 
who embraces this eschatological reality does not believe his neighbor to be damned; the final 
state of souls is indeterminate. The parable of the wheat and tares, so compelling to the early 
Baptists, comes not only with the principle that the tares cannot be pulled up until the end of the 
harvest, but also the hope and acknowledgement that some of those who appear to be tares may 
be found to be wheat at the end of time.  
 The parable of the wheat and tares illustrates three principles that are central to the 
practice of toleration as I have outlined. First, the tares are left in the same field as the wheat. 
Likewise, those who must be the subject of toleration ought not to be excluded from public space 
or quarantined. Second, much is made of the epistemic limitations of our judgment. Just as it is 
difficult to distinguish darnel ryegrass from juvenile wheat, it is difficult to distinguish who is on 
the “right side of history” and who is not. This epistemic limitation serves as an enjoinder against 
the overzealous weeding of the world. Finally, some of those who appear to be tares may, in the 
end, be revealed as wheat. Together, these principles help constitute the ethos of engagement or 
comity that the Baptist proponents of toleration affirmed. Rather than excising unbelievers from 
the community, the believer ought to welcome them, engage them, and grow alongside them. 
This engagement is tempered and bolstered by the epistemic limitations of judgment, as well as 
the conviction that even those who appear to be weeds may be fruitful.  
 The Baptist commitment to comity and engagement with others is evidenced through the 
genealogy I have presented. While many of the other Protestants, fleeing conflict, emigrated 
32 
 
from Holland to settle in the new world, Thomas Helwys led a contingent back to England—and 
did so bearing a treatise defending his beliefs. Later, Roger Williams extended broad religious 
liberties to the inhabitants of Rhode Island, while writing books directed to his English critics. 
He took the ethos of engagement further than most of his contemporaries, living among the 
Narragansett tribe of Native Americans as a missionary and anthropologist. His A Key into the 
Language of America comprises a respectful and generally laudatory outline of their traditions, 
customs, culture, and language.  
 The ethos of engagement provides positive actions to take in light of our considered 
patience and hope. By exercising eschatological patience and tolerating intolerant or 
‘unbelieving’ groups (at least provisionally), we secure a unique opportunity for what Teresa 
Bejan calls “evangelical relations.” While I shy from the fraught terminology of evangelism, 
toleration provides opportunities for engagement with those we disagree with. This engagement 
may be instructive: in Michael Walzer’s words, “They [the intolerant] may learn tolerance; more 
likely, they will learn to act as if they possessed this virtue.” 84 Should we fail to exercise 
patience and thus exclude the intolerant from society, seclude them within homogenous enclaves, 
or destroy them altogether, we lose the opportunity to convince them of the merits of toleration. 
The exercise of eschatological patience defines temporal space within which to practice comity 
towards others. Bejan, discussing Roger William’s commitment to toleration, offers one final 
response to Rousseau’s concern:  
He [Williams] was under no illusion that constant contact with those we believe to be 
culpably in error on the fundamentals would bring us to respect them more. Nevertheless, 
he thought that constant evangelical engagement with the damned could perhaps keep us 
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from demonizing them in the way that cloaking oneself in the righteous certainty of the 
like-minded will.85 
Toleration, so conceived, requires not only the patient and hopeful toleration of ‘unbelievers,’ 
but a type of deep and regular engagement that humanizes them as members of our shared 
political space. Toleration does not preclude peaceful attempts to convert or convince those we 













                                                          
 






Chapter 6: Puzzling Through Toleration 
If the tolerant society is characterized by the free exchange of ideas, and even deeply 
illiberal or intolerant views are permitted within society, what guarantee is there that the tolerant 
or liberal will remain safe? Many contemporary theorists of toleration elucidate the concern that 
intolerant groups will come to dominate the tolerant. Karl Popper characterizes this as the 
“Paradox of tolerance,” writing “Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. 
If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to 
defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be 
destroyed, and tolerance with them. ”86 John Rawls suggests a similar problem, concluding that 
the majority may abridge the freedoms of intolerant sects “when the tolerant sincerely and with 
reason believe that their own security and that of the institutions of liberty are in danger.”87 The 
paradox of tolerance suggests an impasse between the exercise of toleration and the long-term 
stability of a political order. To borrow language from an earlier section of this paper, it seems 
that there is an incommensurable conflict between the exclusive and inclusive models of 
toleration. If we fail to exemplify eschatological patience and establish comity with the 
intolerant, we have failed to display true toleration. However, if we do establish comity, we run 
the risk that they will be more successful in promoting their ideas, and our patience will prevent 
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us from responding adequately to preserve our security. The answer to this problem lies in 
eschatological hope, or the confidence that justice will be done though the skies fall.  
 The “paradox of tolerance” cannot be dismissed glibly. However, the eschatological 
toleration proposed by the early English Baptists outlines an ethos of toleration that may help us 
navigate truly fraught cases. In this last section, I intend to briefly sketch several difficult cases, 
and then outline how this eschatological ethos of toleration guides responses to these cases.88  
The Intolerable Practice 
 Many traditional communities in Africa, Southeast and Central Asia, and the Middle East 
persist in the practice of female genital mutilation (FGM). This practice tends to be socially 
supported (in communities where it persists), and upheld by mature women within the 
community.89 The practice is often interpreted by its practitioners to be religiously obligatory, or 
at least of high importance to cultural practice. To most Western interlocutors, the practice is 
both horrifying and unconscionable—and a clear example of harm perpetuated against women. 
Let us say that within our tolerant society, a group of central African immigrants seek to follow 
their traditional religious practices, which include imposition of FGM. How might the Baptist 
ethos of toleration assist us in navigating this case?  
 In this case, the principle most clearly in conflict is patience. How can we display 
patience towards those who forcibly and painfully perform unnecessary (and deeply harmful) 
surgeries on children? The answer is straightforward: the practice of FGM (at least, when 
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performed on children) is beyond the pale of what patience requires of us. Simply put, the 
commitment not to make heaven on earth does not require us to allow others to make earth more 
hellish. Alternately, to consider the parable of the wheat and tares, not all weeds bear such 
striking resemblance to wheat! The practice of infibulation ought to be excluded from 
toleration—that is, in a liberal society it must move from the realm of social skepticism to legal 
proscription.  
 However, the ideal of patience is not silent here. While FGM performed on children is 
proscribed, patience dictates that so long as consenting adults may have elective cosmetic 
surgery on their faces, breasts, or bellies, consenting adults may have elective cosmetic surgery 
on their genitals. Exercising patience requires that even when a specific practice is found to be 
intolerable, legal solutions must be narrowly tailored to proscribe precisely what is intolerable 
and nothing more. From there, hope and comity take over as the most salient virtues of 
toleration. In hope of a brighter future where such practices no longer exist in any form, the 
tolerant liberal may pursue non-coercive means of persuasion aimed at changing beliefs and 
practices which may be morally repugnant yet not intolerable. Gerry Mackie exemplifies just this 
approach, discussing an agenda of changing social norms through education in order to shape the 
decision-making context that has heretofore preserved the practice of FGM in certain 
communities. Through practicing comity and respecting individuals—though not their practices 
or beliefs—in ways that humanize them, we may seek to overcome those practices we tolerate 
yet find viscerally repulsive, recognizing and responding to the human concerns and interests 
behind their practices or beliefs. The sheer quantity of varying liberal opinions on FGM indicate 




The Persuasive Inegalitarians 
 Let us imagine another case, which may seem familiar to Westerners. Within our tolerant 
society, a religious group espouses illiberal ideas regarding gender norms and the role of women 
in society. Specifically, this group suggests that many careers are inappropriate for females, and 
suggest normatively that women ought to be primarily concerned with childrearing. Further, 
women are excluded from leadership positions within the religious organization, and are often 
subject to certain requirements regarding modest dress, including the wearing of a veil or head-
covering in public.90 These particularities of belief and practice run counter to liberal ideas about 
equality and openness.  
 The religious group seeks to spread their ideas, publishing books, preaching sermons, and 
having conversations with other members of the society at large. Unfortunately for the tolerant 
liberal society, the representatives of this group happen to be charming, personable, well-versed 
in their doctrines, and extremely persuasive – no doubt due to their religion’s focus on 
proselytism. The group grows quickly, and new converts are quick to adopt both the beliefs and 
practices that Western egalitarian liberalism frowns upon.  
 Within the Rawlsian or Popperian schema, this group may be a candidate for ostracism or 
exclusion: the tolerant “sincerely and with reason” fear that they will soon find their society 
fundamentally transformed into something decidedly less liberal. If this criterion is correct, the 
liberal majority may enlist the apparatus of the state to intervene, prohibiting this group from 
proselytizing or publicly airing their doctrines.  
                                                          
90 This hypothetical, much as with the last one, primarily deals with practices rather than beliefs alone. This is not 
because toleration is concerned with practices alone, but because liberalism tends to draw clearer boundaries around 
practices rather than beliefs. If the aim is to bolster liberal accounts, then we will find ourselves dealing with 
interventions into practice. 
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 This answer, as I take it, is unacceptable. While the ‘tolerant’ may be sincere and 
reasonable, there is something deeply concerning about introducing coercive government power 
into this situation, as outlined. At the moment of intervention, the ‘intolerant’ group has not 
coerced anyone to their beliefs, they have not relied on state support for their expansion, and they 
have made no threats. They are merely participating in the marketplace of ideas, and their 
product is selling well. Combatting the ‘persuasive inegalitarian’ with violence introduces a 
concerning and objectionable asymmetry. Coercive state power ought to be reserved for 
interfering in cases of actual harm or coercion: the alternative is hardly tolerance.  
 Should we wish to place this hypothetical on firmer grounds, we might identify the case 
as that of some Muslim populations in Europe or North America.91 How can a hopeful, patient, 
and engaging schema of tolerance respond to this manner of challenge?  
 Whereas patience was the focus of our first hypothetical case, hope plays a greater role 
here. Liberal egalitarians must embrace a more confident view of their own theories, and in turn 
seek to place their views alongside those of the intolerant within the marketplace of ideas. 
Popper’s theory is deeply pessimistic—no doubt due to the political catastrophe that marked his 
time—yet by and large, in the long run, there is reason to be hopeful for liberal democratic 
ideals.  
 It is in cases such as this that the eschatological ethos of toleration provides the strongest 
basis for toleration. Patience dictates moderate, narrowly tailored responses aimed only at 
excluding what is truly intolerable, while hope encourages a confident program of persuasion 
                                                          
91 Other religious groups, including the Old Order Amish, the Roman Catholic Church, or conservative evangelicals 




and solicitude. Together, these produce a relationship characterized by comity, where traditional 
conservative and egalitarian alike share in the respectful exchange of ideas and arguments.92 
 In the case of the conservative Muslim in Europe, this ideal of toleration will not permit 
limitations on the wearing of headscarves or other public symbols of faith, nor will it 
countenance a ban on the construction of minarets. Such proposals fail to exemplify patience, 
hope, or comity. Instead, this is a clear case for tolerance modeled on the parable of the wheat 
and tares. So long as the ‘intolerant’ are content to abide by the general laws of society and 
coexist within it, they must be left to grow in the field until the harvest.  
Concluding Thoughts  
These examples are non-exhaustive, yet serve to illustrate in brief how the ethos of 
tolerance derives from the early English Baptists may address two types of problems: one where 
an inclusive account of toleration fails to provide adequate answers, and one where an exclusive 
account of toleration suggests a troubling solution.  
 Early modern accounts of religious toleration are closely intertwined with the millenarian 
political theology made prominent by early English Baptists. Modern liberal toleration, however, 
by neglecting these theological arguments and instead focusing almost exclusively on the 
privatizing of belief, has retained serious inadequacies. Among other issues, contemporary 
accounts of liberal toleration tend either towards over-exclusion or over-inclusion, failing to 
reach a moderate ground that provides both expansive toleration and long-term stability. In the 
interest of giving credit where credit is due, there are many competing accounts of toleration that 
                                                          
92 Respect, as I use it here, stands only for the respect due to others as moral agents and human beings, rather than 
connoting a respect for their conclusions or ideas.  
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have contributed to the growth of toleration, trust, and peaceful engagement. The traits of 
patience, hope, and comity are not entirely unique: hope is a feature of whiggish toleration, 
patience is a feature of systems such as the Ottoman millet system, and comity is championed by 
those respect based accounts such as those outlined by T.M. Scanlon and Rainier Forst. The 
account of toleration found in the practice and preaching of the early English Baptists I have 
described is unique for two reasons. First, it is historically unique: it would be centuries before 
similarly expansive accounts were offered or widely accepted. Second, this account is unique in 
that it contains and promotes all three virtues—patience, hope, and comity—together. By 
packaging these three aspects of toleration together in one principled package, the early English 
Baptist account of toleration is able to withstand many of the challenges that face other 
simplified or single-faceted approaches to toleration.  
 In returning to long-neglected English-language works on toleration, political theorists 
may recover critical arguments for religious toleration that may serve to bolster or strengthen 
modern conceptions of what it means to be truly tolerant. One such piece is found in the common 
use of eschatological language and symbolism in early arguments for toleration. In particular, 
English Baptist theologians and clergy through the 17th century from Thomas Helwys to 
William Kiffin present a compelling case for an expansive yet confident ethos of religious 
toleration based in their eschatological millenarian theology. Distinct from apocalyptic or 
chiliastic movements, this form of millenarianism is characterized by patience, hope, and comity. 
Transposed into the language of contemporary political theory, these ideas provide a helpful 
standard for evaluating contemporary responses to challenging cases—though primarily as an 
ethos for response rather than through institutional solutions. In order to face the challenges of an 
increasingly globalized world, a successful liberal account of religious toleration will display 
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eschatological patience about its imposition of the ideal society, a confident hope in the ‘moral 
arc’ of history or the battle for truth, and an earnest desire to respectfully engage with those who 
dissent from liberal values. With these three traits, borrowed from the apocalyptic literature on 
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